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SELF-SERVICE SLIP AND FALLS: Is THE STOREKEEPER'S
BURDEN TOO GREAT?
Picture yourself strolling down the aisle of your local grocery store.
Unexpectedly you slip on a banana peel and find yourself lying on the
floor. Feeling embarrassed and humiliated, you get up, finish buying
groceries, and head for home. Later that day you realize that you
suffered an injury because of the fall. As a result of the injury, you
are likely to do two things: seek medical advice, and file a lawsuit
against the storeowner.
The above scenario typifies a great number of the slip and fall cases
that have flooded the courts over the past few decades.' A major reason
for the large number of slip and fall accidents is the fact that local
grocery stores have increasingly given way to giant self-service super-
markets. The giant self-service store gives rise to more traversing of the
aisles, and more people are injured as a result. Prior to 1975, Louisiana
placed a duty on the storeowner to keep the aisles in a reasonably safe
condition, while placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff. 2 A plaintiff
had to prove "a breach of duty of the owner to use reasonable care"3
in order to recover. To carry this burden, most courts held that the
plaintiff was required to prove that the owner had either actual or
constructive notice of a foreign object on the floor. 4
In 1975 the Louisiana Supreme Court, in Kavlich v. Kramer,5 altered
the analysis used in slip and fall cases occurring in self-service stores.
The court held that a plaintiff need only prove that the injuries suffered
resulted from slipping on a foreign object. After an initial showing that
the customer fell and was injured, the burden shifts to the storeowner,
Copyright 1988, by LOUSIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. See Comment, Reducing the Slipperiness of Slip and Fall Litigation: Establishing
Strict Liability for Hotels, 25 Santa Clara L. Rev. 591 (1985); Note, Supermarket Liability:
Problems in Proving the Slip-and-Fall Case in Florida, 18 Fla. L. Rev. 440 (1965).
2. See, e.g., Orgeron v. Home Town Supermarket, 311 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1975); Tripkovich v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 284 So. 2d 80 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 286 So. 2d 663 (1973); Fontanille v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 260 So. 2d 71 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 261 La. 1064, 262 So. 2d 44 (1972).
3. Fontanille v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 260 So. 2d at 73. See also Calamari v. Winn-
Dixie La., Inc., 300 So. 2d 653 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Broussard v. National Food
Stores, Inc., 233 So. 2d 599 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); aff'd, 258 La. 493, 246 So. 2d
838 (1971).
4. Fontanille, 260 So. 2d at 73. See also Frederic v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 227 So.
2d 387 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 254 La. 866, 227 So. 2d 598. (1969).
5. 315 So. 2d 282 (La. 1975).
1LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
who must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was no
negligence contributing to the accident. 6 The court decided to shift the
burden of proof' to the storeowner because of the plaintiff's inability
to protect himself8 and the plaintiff's difficulty in proving negligence
on the part of the storeowner.
A chronological study of self-service slip and fall cases follows,
emphasizing the Kavlich test as it has been expanded by recent cases.
Next, the theory of strict liability under Civil Code article 2317 is
explained, followed by an examination of policy reasons which support
switching the analysis in self-service slip and fall cases from the one
used in Kavlich to strict liability, as well as examples of how specific
cases would be analyzed under a strict liability theory. Last, an argument
is made that the courts should reevaluate their analyses of comparative
fault in these cases.
Historical Development of Louisiana Self-Service Slip and Fall Cases
Until the late 1960's, Louisiana courts applied a general negligence
theory to self-service slip and fall cases. The courts imposed a duty on
the storekeeper to use reasonable care in keeping aisles safe. The appellate
courts, however, interpreted the scope of that duty in a number of
different ways.
One of the interpretations is illustrated by Lofton v. Travelers In-
surance Company,9 which was the commonly accepted rule. In Lofton,
the third circuit required the plaintiff to prove either that the storeowner
or his employees created the hazard or that the storeowner had actual
or constructive knowledge of the condition.10 Because the burden of
proof rested on the plaintiff, a burden difficult to overcome under the
circumstances, cases relying on the Lofton rationale were usually decided
in favor of the defendant-storeowner. 1
6. See Note, The Game's Afoot: The Storekeeper's Heightened Responsibility for
Slip and Fall Accidents, 37 La. L. Rev. 634, 636 n.13 (1977).
7. "The burden then shifts to the defendant to go forward with the evidence to
exculpate itself from the presumption that it was negligent." 315 So. 2d at 285.
8. "Numerous items displayed upon shelving along the aisles or walkways in self-
service stores entice the customers to focus their eyes upon the display rather than on
the surface upon which they walk." 315 So. 2d at 284.
9. 208 So. 2d 739 (La. App. 3d Cir.) writ denied, 252 La. 457, 211 So. 2d 327
(1968).
10. 208 So. 2d at 741-42.
11. See, e.g., Orgeron v. Home Town Supermarket, 311 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1975); Frederic v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 227 So. 2d 387 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 254 La. 866, 227 So. 2d 598 (1969).
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The Lofton case can be contrasted with the first circuit's decision
in Lang v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc.'2 In that case the court held
that:
[Wihile the burden is on the plaintiff to show that ... [the]
substance remained on the floor for a longer time than that in
which it should have been discovered and removed[,J this burden
on the plaintiff is subject to the requirement that the defendant
first show in a preliminary way that the foreign substance was
not discovered in spite of reasonably careful and frequent in-
spection. 3
The decision in Lang, requiring the storeowner to prove reasonable
inspections cuts against the generally accepted rule, illustrated by Lofton.
The determinations made by the Lang court "tended to shift the risk
of self-service shopping from the shopper to the proprietor."'14
The Louisiana Supreme Court resolved this difference among the
circuits in Kavlich v. Kramer.5 In Kavlich, the court adopted a method
for analyzing slip and falls similar to that used in Lang.16 Justice Barham,
writing for the majority, stated that once the plaintiff proves that he
slipped on a foreign object and that the fall caused his injuries, the
burden shifts to the defendant to absolve himself from any negligence. 7
The supreme court reaffirmed its position on self-service slip and falls
in Gonzales v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 8 which is cited frequently
for its explanation of the Kavlich test.
There are numerous reasons for placing the burden on storeowners.
One major reason is the increased hazards created by the self-service
system relative to those that existed in prior times. The court in Kavlich
explained, "Numerous items displayed upon shelving along the aisles
and walkways in self-service stores entice the customers to focus their
eyes upon the display rather than on the surface upon which they
12. 230 So. 2d 383 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969), writ denied, 255 La. 815, 233 So. 2d
252 (1970).
13. 230 So. 2d at 388.
14. Note, supra note 6, at 635.
15. 315 So. 2d 282 (La. 1975).
16. Id. at 285. The court cited for this proposition two first circuit cases, Lang, and
a later case applying Lang, McCauley v. Nicholes, 297 So. 2d 914 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1974). Additionally, the court cited Judge Tate's concurring opinion in Broussard v.
National Food Stores of Louisiana, Inc., 233 So. 2d 599 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970), as
well as a much older case, Joynes v. Valloft & Dreaux, I So. 2d 108 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1941).
17. Id.
18. 326 So. 2d 486 (La. 1976).
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walk." 9 Because of this distraction, storeowners can protect their patrons
better than the unobserving patrons can protect themselves. 20
In addition to the superior ability of the storekeeper to avoid the
hazard, other policy considerations demanded a risk-shifting mechanism
like the one used in Kavlich. In a law review article written several
years later, Justice Tate, in discussing self-service slip and fall cases,
articulated this policy consideration:
The conscious or unconscious judicial response has been to devise
rules, at least in specialized instances where otherwise great
unfairness is perceived, that will tend to fix the loss upon the
actor who creates or maintains the hazard, through whom the
loss will be passed to and shared by society at large, by such
mechanisms as prices to consumers or insurance premiums charged
to the class of ratepayers afforded liability coverage for the
hazard .21
The court in Kavlich concluded that storekeepers are much better spread-
ers of the cost of consumer accidents and, as a result, more risk was
placed on them.
Another consideration is the relative difficulty as between the parties
in meeting the burden of proof. A plaintiff in a slip and fall case may
have a difficult time proving that the storekeeper was negligent. One
commentator, discussing Florida law (which followed a traditional neg-
ligence theory for slip and fall cases), suggested a reason why the plaintiff
has such difficulty in meeting the burden of proof. "Proof of [a prima
facie case in negligence] is severely hampered in most cases because of
the lack of disinterested witnesses. Often, the plaintiff is the only witness
to the fall or the object causing it. ' '22 Foreign substances can be moved
about easily, making proof of their existence more difficult than that
of other, more stationary objects.23 In addition, the storeowner will be
unlikely to cooperate in disclosing information about the incident.
19. 315 So. 2d at 284. The Gonzales court repeated the same type of reason: "The
system [self-service stores] increases the risk of harm from objects dropped on the floor
by customers and, correspondingly, the duty to minimize the risk by frequent inspections
and cleanups." 326 So. 2d at 488.
20. One court has suggested that a patron has the right to presume that the aisles
will be free from dangerous conditions because of the storeowner's intent and knowledge
that the customer will devote his attention to the merchandise and displays. Whittaker
v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets, 334 So. 2d 756, 757 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 338 So. 2d 300 (1976). See also Note, supra note 6, at 639.
21. Tate, Wex Malone and Res Ipsa Loquitur in Louisiana Tort Law, 44 La. L.
Rev. 1397, 1412 (1984). See also, Note, supra note 6, at 640.
22. Note, supra note I, at 443.
23. Id. at 444.
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These policies justify the courts' desire to correct the analysis used
prior to Kavlich. Since Kavlich placed the burden of proof on the
storekeeper, the question that he must answer is what proof it will take
to meet that burden. While shifting the burden, the Kavlich and Gonzales
cases did not tamper with the duty of reasonable care placed on the
storekeeper. This duty includes efforts "to keep objects off the floor
which might give rise to a slip and fall." ' 24 On this theme, the court in
Gonzales stated that "[tihe circumstances that determine the reasona-
bleness of protective measures include the type and volume of mer-
chandise, the type of display, the floor space utilized for customer
service, the nature of customer service, and the volume of business. ' 2
The Louisiana Supreme Court recently reconsidered the proof a
storekeeper must present in order to exculpate himself in a slip and fall
case. In Brown v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Incorporated,6 the plaintiff
slipped and fell on rice that had spilled on the floor. The defendant
proved at trial that fifteen minutes prior to the accident, the store
manager had walked down the same aisle and had not seen anything.
The court of appeal held that by proving that the rice had not been
on the floor long enough to give him constructive notice of the sub-
stance's presence, the defendant had exonerated himself. 27
The supreme court reversed, holding that the more appropriate
inquiry is whether the storekeeper took reasonable steps "to discover
and to correct dangerous conditions reasonably anticipated in its business
activity." '28 The court explained, "[an operator who never conducts
inspections is unlikely to discover unreported hazards. Under such cir-
cumstances, the lack of inspections and other preventive measures results
in the failure to discover dangerous conditions and contributes substan-
tially to the causation of the ensuing fall and injury. ' 29 Because the
storeowner's proof consisted only of the fact that the manager walked
down the aisle "with other things on his mind"30 fifteen minutes prior
to the accident, the supreme court held that there was not an "inspec-
tion" sufficient to relieve the storeowner of the burden. Since no evidence
was presented that any other inspection had been conducted, the store-
owner was liable.
Brown v. Winn-Dixie, then, stands for the proposition that the
storeowner must conduct periodic inspections if he hopes to meet the
24. 315 So. 2d at 284.
25. 326 So. 2d at 488.
26. 452 So. 2d 685 (La. 1984).






burden of proof placed on him by Kavlich and exculpate himself from
liability.3 The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, recently clarified the
Brown v. Winn-Dixie test. In McCardie v. Wal-Mart Stores, Incorpo-
rated,2 Chief Justice Dixon said that mere proof of reasonable inspec-
tions would not absolve a storeowner in a self-service slip and fall case.
Relying on language in Brown v. Winn-Dixie,33 the court added another
condition to meeting the burden. In addition to proving reasonable
inspections, the storeowner must also prove that none of his employees
created the hazard.
The two-part test established by the McCardie court increases the
burden on storeowners, and each element must be considered separately
to determine if the storeowner has exculpated himself. While the rea-
sonableness of inspections is ultimately fact specific, some cases do
suggest the extent of the storeowner's duty. The court in Brown v.
Winn-Dixie held that the degree of vigilance used in the inspections
must be "commensurate with the risk involved, as determined by the
overall volume of business, the time of day, the section of the store,
and other such considerations. '3 4
Two appellate decisions also help illustrate what constitutes a rea-
sonable inspection system and what does not. In Nettles v. Winn-Dixie
Louisiana, Inc.," the acts of the storeowner were not sufficient to meet
the inspection requirement. The plaintiff in Nettles slipped on a white
seedless grape. The defendant proved that his store manager had cleaned
up a spill in the same area five to ten minutes prior to the accident
and had looked up and down the aisle for other misplaced produce.
The defendant had no scheduled inspection system, but argued that the
31. The Brown decision has been adhered to by the lower courts with only a slight
departure found in Nettles v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 496 So. 2d 1296 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1986). In that case, the court noted that "[w]here the record shows that the substance
rested on the floor but for a few minutes before discovery, proof of periodic inspections
would be superfluous." 496 So. 2d at 1299.
32. 511 So. 2d 1134 (La. 1987).
33. The supreme court in Brown v. Winn-Dixie had said, "Under the new evidentiary
burden, the store operator is required to prove that his employees did not cause the
hazard and that he exercised such a degree of care that he would have known under
most circumstances of a hazard caused by customers." 452 So. 2d at 687. The language
above appears to require a twofold burden, but the appellate courts generally had seized
only upon the inspection requirement. See, e.g., McCardie v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 504
So. 2d 111 (La. App 2d Cir.), rev'd, 511 So. 2d 1134 (1987); Bonnette v. K-Mart, Inc.,
502 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987); Batiste v. Joyce's Supermarket, 488 So. 2d
1318 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
34. 452 So. 2d at 687 (La. 1984). Note the similarity between this test and the general
test given in Gonzales for the standard of care of a storekeeper. See supra text accom-
panying notes 24-25.
35. 496 So. 2d 1296 (La App. 3d Cir. 1986).
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manager's independent actions satisfied the inspection requirement. The
trial court found otherwise, and the third circuit agreed. The court made
it clear that a cursory look down the aisle will not meet the inspection
requirement set out in Brown v. Winn Dixie. 6
The facts of the McCardie case, by contrast, did present reasonable
inspection in the opinion of both the second circuit and the supreme
court. In that case, the storeowner proved that a "safety sweep ' 3 7 was
conducted every morning and evening, and that the manager of each
department walked back and forth along the aisles as many as twenty
times an hour.38 In other words, someone was checking the floor as
often as once every three minutes, enough, in the 'two courts' view, to
be reasonable.
While the inspections in McCardie constituted a diligent effort by
the storeowner to keep foreign objects off the floor, as well as to avoid
liability for consumer falls, the Louisiana Supreme Court did not end
the inquiry at reasonable inspections. In addition to his duty to provide
reasonably safe premises, a storeowner may also be liable under a
respondeat superior theory for the negligence of his employees in creating
the condition. Therefore, as Chief Justice Dixon wrote in McCardie,
"Merely proving adequate clean up procedures is insufficient to prove
a spill was not caused by one of the store's own employees." 3 9 Thus,
the next step a storeowner has to take in meeting his burden of proof
is a showing that none of his employees created the hazard.
Since the requirement that the storeowner prove that none of his
employees caused the hazard is fairly new, uncertainty remains as to
what proof will be sufficient to meet the burden. One of the reasons
the storeowner in McCardie did not meet the requirement was that
"[m]any of the employees who could have caused the spill were not
asked to testify."' 4 In his dissent, Justice Cole indicated that the ma-
jority's pronouncement did not imply that all of the employees must
be called to testify. 41 Justice Cole's point follows logically since there
may be no reason to call employees who are rarely, if ever, in the area
where the accident occurred. From the majority's opinion, however, it
seems that at least those employees who are responsible for the area of
the accident must testify in order to meet this burden of proof.
36. "The lightly colored grape on the lightly colored floor would be easily missed
if not observed under close quarters. A true inspection was not made." Id. at 1299.
37. 511 So. 2d at 1135.
38. McCardie v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 504 So. 2d 111, 112 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
rev'd, 511 So. 2d 1134 (1987).
39. 511 So. 2d at 1136.
40. Id.
41. 511 So. 2d at 1136 (Cole, J. dissenting).
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Decision by decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court has increased
the burden on storeowners. Even before the supreme court's decision
in McCardie, it was recognized how onerous that standard was. Justice
Tate wrote that the storeowner's burden was "a most difficult if not
impossible burden for him to carry." '42 Now, with the apparent increase
of the storeowner's burden by the McCardie decision, a few of the
justices of the supreme court are questioning the severity of the shifted
burden.43 Dissenting in McCardie, Justice Marcus considered it "unrea-
sonable for a defendant to have to prove additionally that none of its
employees caused the spill."" He noted that the majority opinion requires
the storeowner to prove a negative, a difficult task at best. Justices
Cole and Lemmon also dissented, agreeing that reasonable inspection
vel non should be the only inquiry.
The analysis developed in Kavlich, and recently expanded by Brown
v. Winn Dixie and McCardie, was a response to difficulties in proving
negligence on the part of the storeowner, dangers created by the self-
service system, and the public policy of spreading risk. These are de-
fensible justifications for placing a greater burden on the storekeeper.
They may not, however, justify the extreme burden which courts now
place on storeowners, which indicates that there may be a better solution.
Self-Service Slip and Fall Cases and Strict Liability
One solution that might be better would be found in a theory of
strict liability. One basis for strict liability in Louisiana can be found
in article 2317 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which provides: "We are
responsible, not only for the damage occasioned by our own act, but
for that which is caused by the act of persons for whom we are
answerable, or of the things which we have in our custody. This is to
be understood with the following modifications. ' 45 This article could
cover a storeowner's liability for a slip and fall, because a customer
could be viewed as suffering damage by a thing that is in the custody
of the storeowner. 46 Louisiana courts, however, have not yet applied
the article to slip and fall cases.
42. Tate, supra note 21, at 1411. See also Note, supra note 6, at 637.
43. It is significant to note that there was dissent to the McCardie majority's opinion,
since none of the justices had dissented in Kavlich or Brown v. Winn-Dixie.
44. 511 So. 2d at 1136 (Marcus, J. dissenting).
45. La. Civ. Code art. 2317.
46. The broad concept given the term custody or "garde" by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Ross v. La Coste de Monterville, 502 So. 2d 1026 (La. 1987), would apparently
encompass anything in the store owned by the proprietor. See Note, Ross v. La Coste
de Monterville: An Unwarranted Extension of Strict Liability for the Act of Things, 47
La. L. Rev. 1285 (1988). 1,
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Until the late 1960's, article 2317 was not interpreted as having any
substantive content because "[ilts structure and its placement between
articles 2315 and 2316, on the one hand, and articles 2318 and 2322,
on the other, make it appear merely transitional." 47 In 1968, an attempt
was made to give the article some substantive force. In Dupre v. Travelers
Insurance Company,48 the first circuit held that although article 2317
does not impose absolute liability for damages caused by one's property,
it does create a "refutable presumption of negligence.' '49
The seldom referred to Dupre case was not an authoritative inter-
pretation of Civil Code article 2317 for long. In 1975, the Louisiana
Supreme Court announced a decision that set the course for strict liability
under article 2317. Justice Tate, writing for the majority in Loescher
v. Parr,50 drew upon French and Louisian- jurisprudence as well as
doctrinal writings to develop a new construct of tort liability.5 In
Loescher, the plaintiff sued the defendant to recover for damage caused
when the defendant's tree fell on top of the plaintiff's automobile. The
court held that the plaintiff's recovery could be based on article 2317.
The test developed in Loescher allowed recovery if the defendant had
custody of the thing that caused the damage, and if that thing had a
vice or a defect that caused the loss.5 2 The court allowed recovery because
the tree was rotten (the defect), owned by the defendant (custody), and
the rottenness of the tree caused the damage. The Loescher decision
did, however, provide the defendant with the defenses of fault of the
victim, fault of third party, or an "irresistible force.""
The supreme court recently elaborated on a part of the Loescher
test. In Entrevia v. Hood,5 4 the court held that the defect of the thing
must be one that presents an unreasonable risk of harm in order for
a plaintiff to recover under article 2317. In that case, the plaintiff
injured herself when she fell through the steps to an unoccupied farm-
house. The steps, although defective in practical terms, were not defective
for the purposes of article 2317, because the farmhouse was "located
in the rear of the fenced and posted property, and the property itself
47. Tunc, Louisiana Tort Law at the Crossroads, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 1111, 1112 (1974).
48. 213 So. 2d 98 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
49. Id. at 100. See also Dickerson v. Continental Oil Co., 449 F.2d 1209 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S 934, 92 S. Ct. 942 (1972); Duplechin v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 265 So. 2d 787 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
50. 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
51. See Malone, Ruminations on Liability for Acts of Things, 42 La. L Rev. 979
(1982).
52. 324 So. 2d at 449.
53. Id. at 447.
54. 427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983).
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was remotely located on a country road." 55 In this setting, the defective
steps did not present an unreasonable risk of harm. Justice Dennis
explained that in order to determine whether a thing presents an un-
reasonable risk of harm, the judge must use a balancing process that
is "similar to that employed in determining whether a risk is unreasonable
in a traditional negligence problem." '5 6 The Entrevia court said that the
balancing test, done by the judge in determining social utility, is similar
to the process by which "the legislator finds the standards or patterns
of utility and morals in the life of the community." '5 7 Entrevia clarifies
the Loescher test by holding that a thing defective in fact does not give
rise to liability under article 2317 unless that thing presents an unrea-
sonable risk of harm, or, in other words, unless the thing is defective
in law.
Although strict liability under article 2317 may suggest difficulties
for many defendants, an analysis of recent slip and fall jurisprudence
makes the strict liability scheme more attractive than the expanded
Kavlich approach. One reason this is so can be found in the unreasonable
risk of harm criteria of strict liability under Entrevia. In that case the
court held that if a custodian's defective thing injures someone, that
custodian may not be held liable unless the thing presented an unrea-
sonable risk of harm.5" Under slip and fall jurisprudence, however, even
if the thing did not present an unreasonable risk,5 9 a storeowner will
be liable, unless it is proven that reasonable inspections were conducted
and that the hazard was not created by the storekeeper's employees.
A hypothetical situation, analyzed under the Kavlich reasoning (fol-
lowed to its logical end) and under strict liability, illustrates the problem
in the slip and fall area and demonstrates that strict liability results in
a more rational solution. Suppose that a mischievous youth overturns
a grocery cart in the middle of aisle six. A shopper then comes up the
aisle and runs into the overturned cart, suffering injuries. Under the
current slip and fall analysis, the storeowner will be liable unless rea-
sonable inspections and lack of employee causation is proven, even
though the shopping cart is a large, visible object which presents a
55. Id. at 1150. The court may have also been influenced by the fact that Entrevia
was a trespasser.
56. Id. at 1149.
57. Id. at 1150.
58. Id. at 1149.
59. One might illustrate this using the facts of Lewis v. Piggly Wiggly of Ferriday,
Inc., 403 So. 2d 95 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981). In this case the plaintiff slipped and fell
in a large puddle of bright orange salad dressing that was on a light colored floor. The
court recognized that the substance was "readily observable" but still held that the
storeowner did not prove he acted reasonably.
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minimal risk to shoppers.6 Under a strict liability analysis, however, a
negligence-type balancing test done pursuant to Entrevia should lead to
the conclusion that the 'shopping cart presented no unreasonable risk of
harm, and thus the storeowner will not be liable. Although many things
in a self-service store may present an unreasonable risk, things like the
shopping cart above do not. The cart does not present an unreasonable
risk of harm because of its size and a duty on the part of reasonable
persons to see certain things. This illustrates the problems associated
with the slip and fall test compared with the reasonableness of strict
liability.
A second reason the Loescher-Entrevia strict liability test is preferable
derives from the shift of the burden of proof to the defendant under
Kavlich. In a slip and fall case, if the storeowner cannot prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he acted reasonably and that his
employees did not cause the fall, the decision will have to be for the
plaintiff since the storeowner will not have carried the burden of proof.
The opposite is true in a strict liability case. If the plaintiff cannot
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the thing presented an
unreasonable risk of harm, the decision will have to favor the defendant,
since the plaintiff has not carried his burden.
The courts shifted the burden of proof in slip and fall cases to
prevent the plaintiff from having to prove that there was a foreseeable
risk of harm. This was partially because of the difficulty of proving
that the storeowner had actual or constructive knowledge of the risk,
as he did under pre-Kavlich slip and fall jurisprudence. 6' Using a strict
60. Although comparative fault principles would operate to decrease the plaintiff's
recovery under this hypothetical, the failure of the storeowner to carry his burden of
proof would necessitate a finding of some degree of fault, and thus liability, on his part.
If, however, the courts in dealing with slip and fall cases follow the recent Louisiana
Supreme Court pronouncement in Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123 (La.
1988), the storeowner may not be liable to a plaintiff who runs into a shopping cart.
The Murray court held that the duty/risk test should be applied in "cases where it may
not be reasonable to require the defendant to protect the plaintiff from all of the risks
associated with a particular activity." Id. at 1135. Murray can be interpreted as holding
that for conditions that are open and obvious to most reasonable persons (like the shopping
cart), the risk that a person will injure himself because of that condition is not encompassed
within the defendant's duty to protect against that condition. Following Murray might
lead to the conclusion that the storekeeper is not liable because it is reasonable to say
that the risk that a shopper will run into an "open and obvious" shopping cart is not
encompassed within the duty of the storekeeper to protect his patrons.
61. See, e.g., Orgeron v. Home Town Supermarket, 311 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1975); Frederic v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 227 So. 2d 387 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 254 La. 866, 227 So. 2d 598 (1969); Lofton v. Travelers Ins. Co., 208 So. 2d
739 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). The supreme court in Brown v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 452
So. 2d 685, 686 (La. 1984) said that "[t]he critical effect of the partial shifting of the
evidentiary burden was the virtual elimination of proof of actual or constructive knowledge
as an element of the plaintiff's case."
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liability approach, this end can be accomplished without the burden
shift. Under that theory, the plaintiff need only prove that the thing
presented an unreasonable risk and need not prove foreseeability. This
would make the plaintiff's burden less orerous than it was prior to
Kavlich, while simultaneously easing the b irden on storeowners, who
would no longer have the burden of proof.
A third reason flows from the susceptibility to fraud of the approach
used in the Kavlich line of cases. This possibility arises because the
shifted burden relieves the plaintiff of most of the proof requirements
in a slip and fall case, thereby requiring the plaintiff to come forward
with very little hard evidence to win.6 2 All that the plaintiff need prove
is that he slipped on a foreign object and was injured. In theory, it
would be easy for a plaintiff with a preexisting injury to walk into a
self-service store, place a foreign object on the floor while no one was
looking, and allege he slipped on it. Because there would be no witnesses,
the only evidence of the fall would be the plaintiff's perjured testimony.
This, however, would be sufficient to carry the plaintiff's burden of
proof and would shift the burden to the storeowner. If the storeowner
could not prove reasonable inspections and that none of his employees
created the condition, he would lose.
Switching to strict liability would help solve this fraudulent plaintiff
problem, because the plaintiff would have to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence not only that he slipped and fell on a foreign object,
but also that the object presented an unreasonable risk of harm. Placing
this burden of proof on the plaintiff would facilitate a finding in favor
of the storeowner when the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's
case suggest fraud.
Analyzing self-service slip and fall cases under a strict liability theory
would be fairer to the storekeeper because he would not have the burden
of proof. At the same time, the plaintiff's burden would be lighter than
in pre-Kavlich times, because he would not have to prove actual or
constructive knowledge on the part of the storekeeper. 63 Because strict
liability would be fairer to the storekeeper, while at the same time
placing the plaintiff in a better situation than that prior to Kavlich, the
courts should switch to an analysis of these cases under article 2317.
With the proposition that self-service slip and fall cases should be
analyzed under strict liability, it is now important to show the ways in
which a typical case might be analyzed under a strict liability approach.
62. See, e.g., Thomas v. K-Mart Corp., No. 87-31, slip op. (La. App. 3d Cir. Feb.
3, 1988); Zeagler v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc., 521 So. 2d 766 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1988).
63. See cases cited supra note 61.
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According to Loescher, as clarified by Entrevia, a person may be strictly
liable under article 2317 for a thing that causes damage to another when
he has the custody or "garde" 64 of the thing, and the thing has a defect
that presents an unreasonable risk of harm. To apply this test to a self-
service slip and fall case, two steps are required.
The first step is to ascertain whether or not the storeowner had
custody of the thing which caused the damage. The term custody or
"garde" as used in Loescher was said to apply to "those things to
which one bears such a relationship as to have the right of direction
and control over them, and to draw some kind of benefit from them. '65
The above would most obviously include things that are owned and in
the physical possession of the defendant. This was the defendant's
situation in Loescher, since he had ownership as well as possession of
the rotten tree. 66
Since the premises and all things therein are usually owned by the
storekeeper, the custody question in most slip and fall cases would be
a simple determination. The great majority of cases will involve items
owned by the storeowner. Since these things will be considered in the
storeowner's custody, a plaintiff will usually never have to resort to
negligence at this stage of the inquiry. 67 The cotton candy or ice cream
bought next door and brought inside by a third person may not fall
within the scope of the term custody. 6 These items could, however,
arguably be within the storekeeper's custody because he has control and
can remove them. He may also derive a benefit from these items, because
allowing customers to bring these into the store may enhance his business.
The main problem in analyzing these cases under strict liability will
lie in the defect requirement, because it is difficult to conceptualize a
64. In Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975), the supreme court noted that
the French term "sous sa garde" or "garde" was not fully expressed by the English
translation of "custody," and that one could "lose the custody of a thing without losing
its 'garde."' 324 So. 2d at 447 n.6.
65. Id. at 449 n.7.
66. Id. at 449.
67. If negligence is resorted to, it should be applied using the test prior to Kavlich,
or in other words, with no shifting of the burden. Since strict liability provides plaintiffs
with a reasonable burden, there is no reason to also provide them with the pro-plaintiff
test in Kavlich.
68. The seemingly broad interpretation of the custody or "garde" concept in Ross
v. La Coste de Monterville, 502 So. 2d 1026 (La. 1987), may not give the storeowner
custody of a thing brought into his store by a third party. The Louisiana Supreme Court,
interpreting the French law behind article 2317, held that "an owner of a thing who
transfers its possession, but not its ownership to another, continues to have the garde of
its structure .... " 502 So. 2d at 1032. This broadens the scope of the term "custody"
as it relates to ownership; however, it may or may not grant a storeowner the custody
of things which he does not own and are brought into the store by third parties.
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self-service store as "defective." Contributing to this problem is the first
circuit's opinion in Brown v. Winn-Dixie.69 In that case, the plaintiff
slipped and fell on some rice in the defendant's supermarket. The
plaintiff argued that "the presence of rice on the floor renders the store
premises defective and presents an unreasonable risk of haim to the
public, rendering defendant liable under Article 2317 of the Civil Code." '70
The court did not agree, saying, "the temporary presence of a foreign
substance on the floor is not a defect within the meaning ... of the
law. A defect is some flaw or fault existing or inherent in the thing
itself.'' 7 ,
The first circuit in Brown v. Winn-Dixie apparently based its analysis
on a defect-in-fact rather than a defect-in-law theory. The choice between
these theories will be critical in the analysis of slip and fall cases under
strict liability. As the Entrevia court suggested, a thing may be defective
in fact without being defective-in-law, that is, creating an unreasonable
risk of harm. In some instances, Louisiana courts have held that a thing
was defective because it presented an unreasonable risk of harm even
though it was not necessarily defective in practical terms. 72 In other
cases, however, courts have required a factual defect in addition to the
unreasonable risk of harm. 73
Finding a factual defect will be a difficult task, especially since the
Brown v. Winn Dixie court's "inherent defect" language apparently
precludes the argument that a floor can be factually defective. There
may, however, be conditions of some floors in self-service stores that
make them factually defective. Most of these floors are slick in order
to facilitate cleaning. This attribute tends to make them even more
slipp6ry, and therefore more dangerous if a foreign substance is placed
on them. This intentionally slippery surface may make the floor itself
factually defective. If this is the case, the slipperiness of the floor presents
69. 417 So. 2d 44 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 452 So. 2d 685 (La. 1984). The
supreme court reversed on the grounds that the test used by the lower court in negligence
was improper, and therefore the defendant was liable.
70. 417 So. 2d at 45.
71. Id. at 46.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 74-76.
73. See, e.g., Crochet v. Freeman, 504 So. 2d 1064 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987) (must
have a defect "in" the premises, object on the premises will not meet the requirement);
Ducote v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 488 So. 2d 385 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 493 So. 2d 637 (1986) (ladder not defective because there-was no evidence that
it had a vice or defect in its construction or design); Efferson v. State, 463 So. 2d 1342
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1984), writ denied, 465 So. 2d 722 (1985) (road "structurally" defective
because of shoulder conditions); Brown v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 417 So. 2d 44 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1982), rev'd 452 So. 2d 685 (1985) (rice on floor was not fault inherent "in"
the thing so defect requirement was not met).
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an unreasonable risk of harm, and the storeowner could be held strictly
liable to the injured plaintiff.
Fitting these cases under article 2317 by relying solely on the de-
fective-in-law idea, however, would be much easier. In an analogous
case, Lewis v. Oubre7 4 the court was confronted with determining
whether a wet carport presented an unreasonable risk of harm for the
purposes of article 2317. The carport was dangerous because it became
slippery when the weather was humid. Nonetheless, the court found that
the carport surface did not create an unreasonable risk because the
plaintiff had walked across it several times before the slip, and its glossy
appearance should have given the plaintiff notice. The defendant in
Lewis could have been liable under different circumstances. 75
The surface of the carport in Lewis is similar to a floor in a self-
service store that has something on it, since both are slippery. Moreover,
the floor of a self-service store is more likely to present an unreasonable
risk of harm than the carport because of the displays, which direct the
attention of the shopper to the shelves and away from the floor. This
distraction makes the presence of a foreign substance on the floor even
more dangerous, and it might make that danger rise to the level of
unreasonableness, triggering strict liability. Thus, a much stronger case
for strict liability arises.
Another case that relied on the defect-in-law theory is Morgan v.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. 76 In that case, the plaintiff tripped
and fell because of an unexpected eight-inch drop in a church floor.
The stepdown was difficult to discern because each side was standard
grey concrete and the lighting was poor. The supreme court found that
the floor created an unreasonable risk of harm, thus was defective, and
applied article 2317. The importance of this case lies in the fact that
the floor was not really practically defective. The floor had not been
designed improperly, nor was there any faulty condition. According to
the supreme court, it was the circumstances, not the design of some
74. 461 So. 2d 523 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984), writ denied, 465 So. 2d 735 (1985). In
this case, the plaintiff, acting as a substitute sitter for the elderly Mr. Oubre, went through
the carport to empty a garbage can. Upon her return, she slipped on the carport, which
had become damp in the humid Louisiana climate.
75. The court made certain to say that there were circumstances peculiar to this case
and that the carport in this isolated instance was not unreasonably dangerous. 461 So.
2d at 525. Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1988), might also be
applicable here. It could be argued that the wet carport was an "open and obvious" risk
and therefore the duty of the homeowner would not extend to the risk that someone
would walk across it and injure himself. This finding would absolve the defendant of
liability and further distinguish the case from a typical self-service slip and fall case,
where the storeowner has a greater duty to protect his patrons.
76. 402 So. 2d 640 (La. 1981).
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later-arising flaw, that created an unreasonable risk. Floors in self-service
stores are analogous, because they are designed in a proper manner.
However, under certain circumstances, namely when a foreign object is
on them, they can be very dangerous, especially where the shopper's
attention is diverted by displays. Reasoning from the Morgan case, those
floors may be defective because they present a similarly unreasonable
risk, and the storeowner could be strictly liable.
An alternative method of fitting these cases under article 2317 is to
switch the inquiry from whether the floor is defective to whether the
thing on the floor is defective. Relying again on the Morgan case, one
can argue that the thing on the floor may itself be defective if it presents
an unreasonable risk of harm, even though there is nothing inherently
dangerous about it. Things on the shelves do not present any danger,
but once they are on the floor they could be unreasonably dangerous
because a distracted plaintiff is not likely to see them. As before, the
inquiry becomes problematical if the thing in question was brought in
from outside the store, for the storeowner may not have the "garde"; 77
but in the usual case it can be fairly argued that the thing on the floor
is defective (that is, unreasonably dangerous), thus justifying the ap-
plication of strict liability.
The best method for analyzing slip and fall cases under strict liability
is the defect-in-law theory. This theory eliminates the need for the court
to find an actual defect in the floor. By focusing on the floor rather
than the foreign object, it also solves the problem of determining custody.
This approach to self-service slip and fall cases would best realize the
goal of providing a solution that is fairer to storekeepers while not
putting the plaintiffs into the objectionable situation which existed prior
to Kavlich. Under this approach, the storekeeper would not be required
to exonerate himself until the plaintiff first had presented evidence of
the fall, the injury, and the unreasonable risk posed by the storekeeper's
premises.
Comparative Negligence and Self-Service Slip and Fall Cases
The test for the storekeeper's liability, however, is not the only
aspect of these cases that needs clarification. The application of com-
parative negligence in self-service slip and fall claims should also be
analyzed and reappraised. The analysis of slip and fall cases under
comparative negligence8 should not be noticeably different using the
77. See supra text accompanying notes 65-68.
78. La. Civ. Code art. 2323 provides in pertinent part:
If a person suffers injury, death or loss as the result partly of his own
negligence and partly as a result of the fault of another person or persons, the
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strict liability approach rather than the Kavlich theory, because Louisiana
courts have held that comparative negligence is applicable in strict liability
cases under article 2317.19 The first inquiry to be made, however, is
whether a plaintiff's fault should ever reduce his recovery in a self-
service case. Policy reasons based on the storeowner's intent to distract
the the consumer, the dangers associated with the self-service system,
and the storekeeper's ability to spread the loss more efficiently may
suggest that the storeowner should bear all the liability.
One decision suggested in dicta that owners of self-service stores
should assume full responsibility for accidents in their stores, regardless
of victim fault. In Dulaney v. Travelers Insurance Co.,S° the first circuit,
using a duty-risk analysis, noted that "slip and fall cases occurring in
display areas . . . [are cases] where the defendant's duty extends to the
protection of a plaintiff against his own carelessness . ".... s The first
circuit adopted this conclusion because the plaintiff's "attention is pre-
sumed to be attracted to the advertised goods on the shelves." 8 2 Since
the storeowner intentionally distracts the plaintiff, he cannot hope to
have the amount he must pay reduced based on the plaintiff's negligence.
A plaintiff's carelessness would therefore not reduce his recovery under
Dulaney. Since the accident occurred in a parking lot where there were
no distracting displays, the court's finding that comparative fault would
be inapplicable in cases involving display area slip and fall cases was
merely dicta.. Nevertheless, several third circuit decisions have reversed
jury findings of victim fault in self-service slip and fall cases, citing
Dulaney as authority. 3
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly rejected
the Dulaney dicta in Jones v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc.14 The court dealt
with a fall occurring in a self-service store; however, the plaintiff tripped
in a hole instead of slipping on a foreign object, so strict liability was
applied along with negligence. The Fifth Circuit reviewed the trial court's
application of comparative fault and relied on the principles of Bell v.
claim for damages shall not thereby be defeated, but the amount of damages
recoverable shall be reduced in proportion to the degree or percentage of
negligence attributable to the person suffering the injury death or loss.
79. See, e.g., Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1988); Landry v.
State, 495 So. 2d 1284 (La. 1986).
80. 434 So. 2d 578 (La. App. 1st Cir 1983).
81. Id. at 582.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Saucier v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 499 So. 2d 1033 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1986); Nettles v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 496 So. 2d 1296 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986); Batiste
v. Joyce's Supermarket, 488 So. 2d 1318 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
84. 775 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1985).
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Jet Wheel Blast.5 In Jet Wheel, the Louisiana Supreme Court was called
upon to decide if comparative fault applied in strict products liability
cases. The supreme court held that comparative fault "may be applied
in certain categories of cases to reduce the plaintiff's recovery." '86 It
also found that comparative fault would be inappropriate in some cases,
and the Jet Wheel facts fell into that category. The court pointed out
that the "plaintiff was injured while performing a repetitive operation
with a defective industrial machine as required by his employer." 8 7 The
supreme court concluded that comparative fault would not significantly
increase the employee's incentive to protect his hands, while it would
decrease a manufacturer's incentive to produce a safer product. The
court thus held that the defendant would be held solely liable.
After discussing Jet Wheel at length, the Fifth Circuit in Jones
found that:
Unlike a worker using dangerous machinery to perform repetitive
tasks under the direction of his employer, a customer walking
down the aisle of a public retail store is fully open to the
economic incentives provided by a comparative fault regime.
Conversely, to foreclose the use of comparative fault would
subject the proprietors of such premises to perverse incentives;
expenditures on preventing accidents would tend to rise to an
inefficient level and non-negligent customers would inappropri-
ately bear the burden of increased prices. 8
Seizing upon language from Jet Wheel, the Fifth Circuit was "persuaded
that 'the threat of a reduction in recovery will provide consumers with
an incentive to use a [retail store's premises] carefully; without exacting
an inordinate sacrifice of other interests."' 8 9
Currently, some appellate decisions rely on Dulaney, while others
follow Jones. One recent and more logical approach attempts to reconcile
the two. In Brown v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 90 the plaintiff
followed the manager into the store immediately upon its opening and
slipped in a puddle. The court of appeal reversed a trial court's finding
of fifty-percent fault on the part of the plaintiff because of a lack of
evidence as to whether the plaintiff actually saw or should have seen
the object that caused the fall.
This decision to reverse the trial court's finding of plaintiff fault
appears to follow the Dulaney approach, but the court went on to
85. 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985).
86. Id. at 171.
87. Id. at 172.
88. 775 F.2d at 665.
89. Id.
90. 509 So. 2d 557 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
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suggest that in some cases a plaintiff's recovery should be reduced:
Under certain circumstances a grocery store patron could be
negligent in contributing to her own accident and injuries; for
instance, where the shopper actually sees a potentially dangerous
condition and fails to take reasonable precautions to avoid the
danger. Also, it is arguable that, under certain circumstances,
a store patron could fail to see a hazard which she reasonably
should have seen and that by her failure she negligently caused
her own injuries. 91
This analysis, which allows the application of comparative negligence
in appropriate cases, is better than the unqualified approaches taken in
Dulaney and Jones. Storekeepers and patrons should have variable duties
because of the wide variety of circumstances which can result in slips
and falls. It should not be said that comparative negligence should
always apply; nor should it be said that it should never apply. The
analysis in Brown v. A&P, however, is insufficient because it lacks
adequate detail.
A better approach would be to categorize cases according to the
parties' respective duties and the policies applicable to the situations.
The following discussion suggests four general categories and explains
the application of certain policies and rules to each, which leads to
certain outcomes.
The first of these categories is the case of the plaintiff who was
distracted by the displays and neither saw nor should have seen the
object. This situation can be illustrated by using the facts of Nettles v.
Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc.92 There, the plaintiff slipped and fell on a
white seedless grape while pushing a shopping cart along the produce
aisle. The grape was on a lightly colored floor and was very hard to
see. Under these facts the plaintiff was probably not negligent; even so,
Dulaney should govern, since the storekeeper's duty should encompass
the patron's carelessness. A distracted person should not have a duty
to see every object that may be on the floor. The storekeeper's duty
should encompass the risk that the patron will not see nonapparent
objects. Therefore, comparative fault should not be applied in this
category of cases.
The second category includes plaintiffs who are distracted and do
not see the object, but should have under the circumstances. This sit-
uation is illustrated by the example of the shopping cart left in the
middle of the aisle. 93 This was the situation contemplated in Brown v.
91. Id. at 560 (citations omitted).
92. 496 So. 2d 1296 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
93. See supra text accompanying note 60.
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A&P, where the court said that under certain circumstances a shopper
might fail to see what he reasonably should have seen. This distracted-
but-should-have-seen category should be governed by Jones, as it is
"fully open to the economic incentives provided by a comparative fault
regime." ' 94 Applying comparative negligence here would recognize the
duty of the patron to act reasonably in protecting himself, and would
produce an incentive on the part of the shopper to use reasonable care.
At the same time, it would maintain an incentive for the storeowner
to inspect his premises for dangers to shoppers. 95
The third category is more complicated. It includes plaintiffs who
saw the object, but momentarily forgot about it and slipped and fell
on it. The problem here is one of deciding whether the storekeeper's
duty should encompass the shopper's momentary forgetfulness, and
therefore reduction should be precluded under Dulaney, or whether the
shopper's recovery should be reduced pursuant to Brown and Jones,
because he failed to take reasonable precautions to avoid the hazard.
There are persuasive arguments on each side. The displays may have
lured the shopper's attention away from the hazard and contributed to
the forgetfulness. Since the storekeeper is presumed to intend to lure
his shopper's into looking at the displays, 96 his duty to provide safe
floors should include the plaintiff's momentary forgetfulness.
On the other hand, the plaintiff may not be lured away, but just
be careless. This would be a case in which the plaintiff should be
required to act more reasonably, and calls for the application of com-
parative fault. The outcome of these cases must turn on the factual
question of whether -the plaintiff was distracted or merely careless. A
distracted plaintiff should not have his recovery reduced because of the
storekeeper's actions in distracting him. A careless plaintiff, however,
should suffer the application of comparative negligence. This would
provide an incentive against carelessness.
94. 775 F.2d at 665.
95. It is important to note that with the new developments under Murray v. Ramada
Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1988), the outcomes of some cases in the second category
may not be so simple to determine. In some instances it may be proper to hold that a
defendant's duty does not extend to "open and obvious" risks. If the shopping cart was
found to be "open and obvious" to reasonable persons, the risk that a shopper might
run into it may not be encompassed within the storeowner's duty to protect his patrons.
If such is the case, the storeowner will owe no duty to the plaintiff. In those cases,
comparative fault will not apply since the storeowner escapes liability completely at the
duty level.
96. Whittaker v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets, 334 So. 2d 756, 757 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 338 So. 2d 300 (1976); Lang v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 230




The last situation is the most extreme. In these cases the plaintiff
actually sees the object, but voluntarily encounters it, slips, and falls.
This category would seem to fall under the doctrine of assumption of
risk, since the plaintiff voluntarily encounters a known risk. Application
of that doctrine might have served as a complete bar to the plaintiff's
recovery, 97 however, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently in Murray
v. Ramada Inns, Inc.98 held that "the assumption of risk defense no
longer has a place in Louisiana tort law." 99 The court found that the
doctrine was easily replaceable by other tort principles such as com-
parative fault and the duty-risk analysis. 10° Murray says that "the fact
that the plaintiff may have been aware of the risk . . . should not
operate as a total bar to recovery. Instead, comparative fault principles
should apply." 10 1 Therefore, the plaintiffs in category four, having
knowledge of the particular risk, will not be subject to the defense of
assumption of risk. Comparative negligence will be applied and "the
victim's 'awareness of the danger' is among the factors to be considered
in assessing percentage of fault.' ' 0 2
If the plaintiff is found to have acted extremely unreasonably in
encountering the risk, then his recovery may be completely barred despite
Murray. This could be accomplished by finding the plaintiff's action
the sole cause of the accident, thus allocating 100% of the fault to
him. Alternatively, the court could find that the defendant's duty to
provide reasonably safe premises did not encompass the risk of the
plaintiff's behavior.
Since self-service slip and fall cases are a special breed, special rules
should be developed to deal with comparative negligence. As the Jones
case reveals, the policies underlying that scheme generally make these
cases ripe for the application of the incentives provided by a comparative
fault regime. In some instances, however, a storekeeper's duty should
encompass the risk of the negligence, and comparative fault should not
apply. Since that is the case, the courts should categorize each plaintiff
and obtain results based upon the specific policies and rules applicable.
97. Louisiana courts of appeal had taken divergent views on this issue. Compare
Aguillard v. Langlois, 471 So. 2d 1011 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 476 So. 2d 356
(1985), which held that under the comparative fault regime, assumption of risk no longer
.operated as a complete bar, with Brown v. Harlan, 468 So. 2d 723 (La. App. 5th Cir.),
writ dismissed, 472 So. 2d 26 (1985), which held that assumption of risk still served as
a complete bar to recovery in both negligence and strict liability cases.
98. 521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1988).
99. Id. at 1125.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1134.
102. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The supreme court's desire to solve a problem for plaintiffs in self-
service slip and 'fall cases was justified because of the potentially dan-
gerous nature of the self-service system, and because the storekeeper
was better able to spread costs. The analysis initiated in Kavlich and
culminating in the McCardie decision, however, is not the best solution.
A test is needed which is fairer to the storeowner but still protects the
plaintiff.
Strict liability is such a test. Under this theory, the burden of proof
would no longer be on the storeowner, while the plaintiff would not
have the difficult burden of proving negligence, as he did prior to
Kavlich. Using Entrevia, the determinative issue would be whether the
condition of the floor presented an unreasonable risk, with reasonable-
ness based on a social utility test, thus providing a more rational
outcomes in slip and fall cases. Finally, the "fraudulent plaintiff" prob-
lem will be remedied because the plaintiff will have the burden of proof,
decreasing the possibility of his winning fraudulently. These cases would
easily fit under strict liability by using the Entrevia unreasonable risk
of harm test.
Not only should the theory of legal liability be changed, the way
in which these cases are analyzed under comparative negligence should
be reconsidered. Two competing theories exist in this area. One is to
have the storeowner bear all liability for plaintiff fault in all cases
because of the customer's inability to protect himself. The second is to
apply comparative fault in all cases because of the incentives created
under that scheme. The better approach is to analyze each case according
to specific categories which have different policies applicable to them.
Recognizing the policies appropriate to each individual case will lead to
a variety of outcomes, each based on the facts of the specific case
rather than a rigid theoretical rule.
John Michael Robinson, Jr.
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